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A quest for WTO’s legitimacy
S U N G J O O N C H O*

The WTO Consultative Report, dubbed the ‘ Sutherland Report ’ (the Report), was
released on 17 January 2005 in an attempt to identify the WTO’s institutional
challenges, to provide non-binding recommendations from eminent persons, and
thus to trigger a ‘process of reﬂection ’.1 While these challenges (and criticism)
vary, they are inextricably linked to the fundamental question of the legitimacy of
WTO as a system, not necessarily as a mere gathering of 148 Members. In fact, the
question has hotly been debated ever since the WTO’s creation, generating a great
deal of debates and reactions among scholars and politicians alike.
The Report did not explicitly address the question of WTO’s legitimacy. In a
sense, every chapter of the Report is related to WTO’s legitimacy in that both
WTO’s norm (e.g., non-discrimination) and institution (e.g., dispute settlement
mechanism and decision-making procedure) eventually shape how the WTO is
perceived and evaluated by the outside world. Yet, Chapter V ‘ Transparency and
Dialogue with Civil Society ’ may be considered as the most proximate chapter to
the theme of legitimacy in that it attempted to respond to one of the most vocal
critics of the WTO, i.e., non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society,
as well as their main criticism, i.e., lack of transparency.
In a nutshell, the Report conﬁrmed the WTO’s achievements in improving its
external relations with NGOs ; attempted to disillusion NGOs, for instance the
disparity of capacity and resources among them ; and recommended Members to
take stronger initiatives in this issue through oﬀering more funding and guidance.
Although the Report’s analysis and recommendations in Chapter V are generally
agreeable, the chapter leaves further questions regarding WTO’s legitimacy. In
particular, it did not pay due attention to the general public, i.e., actual/potential
‘ users ’ of the WTO system. Although NGOs and civil society may hold certain
stakes and inﬂuences in WTO’s legitimacy, they are not users of the system per se,
even if we fully grapple with their often elusive identities. After all, WTO’s
legitimacy ultimately rests on voices of everyday people around the world (vox
populi).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illionois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL,
USA.
1 ‘ The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium’, WTO
Consultative Report, ‘ Foreword ’, at 2 [hereinafter the Report]. This Report can be downloaded from the
WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/10anniv_e.htm#future. See also
Sungjoon Cho, ‘ The Future of the WTO: Report by the Consultative Board’, ASIL Insights (Januaury
2005), http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/01/insight050131.htm.
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This comment approaches the issue of legitimacy as one of the main challenges
that WTO faces today. The comment documents and ampliﬁes certain analyses
and recommendations in Chapter V of the Report and then further pushes the
legitimacy question by focusing on the WTO’s images and perception to ordinary
people. It concludes that education and social marketing can contribute to
enhancing WTO’s legitimacy, and calls for more investment in such direction.

1. Two concepts of legitimacy
The concept of legitimacy as an evaluative criterion for a polity or an institution
can be deﬁned both narrowly and broadly. A narrow deﬁnition mainly concerns
formal procedures,2 such as ratiﬁcation, while a broad one concerns ‘societal
acceptability ’ of the polity or institution.3 This narrow and broad concept of
legitimacy is deeply associated with the institutional nature of WTO. The more
one emphasizes the ‘inter-governmental ’ nature of the WTO, the closer its legitimacy approaches a narrow view. According to this view, the WTO’s legitimacy is
attributed to that of WTO Members. If Member governments are legitimate,
then the WTO should also be legitimate because these governments negotiated,
signed, and ratiﬁed the WTO. Yet, that is not the end of the story, at least to
those who cast doubts on the WTO’s legitimacy. Even though the WTO is a
Member-driven organization, Members themselves often blame the WTO
system itself, not merely other Members, for various alleged failures and poor
performance, be they concerning negotiation or dispute settlement.4
Yet, more routine attack on the WTO’s alleged lack of legitimacy has
steadily been undertaken by NGOs and the titular civil society. Thanks to the
‘global associational revolution ’,5 new players like NGOs have recently been
added to the global trading community, rendering the intergovernmental ethos
less sustainable than before. At the same time, the success of GATT and the
launch of WTO have generated high expectations among observers and pulled
like a ‘ magnet ’ attention from a broad audience.6 This widening of the observer
or stakeholder circle has led to a shift in the dimension of WTO’s legitimacy

2 See Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale L. J. 2403, 2468–2469 (1991)
[hereinafter Weiler, ‘ Transformation’]. In a similar yet slightly diﬀerent context, Thomas Franck scrutinized the legitimacy of international rules by focusing on a ‘rule’s and a rule-making process’ legitimacy,’
and regarded legitimacy in terms of the ‘ compliance pull’ of such rules. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of
Legitimacy among Nations (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 49.
3 Weiler, ‘Transformation’, supra note 2, at 2468–2469.
4 See, e.g., Max Baucus, ‘US Trade Laws and the WTO’, http://www.senate.gov/~ﬁnance/press/
pr092702.pdf (condemning the WTO tribunal as a ‘kangaroo court’).
5 The Report, supra note 1, para. 176.
6 See Steve Charnovitz, ‘Triangulating the World Trade Organization’, 96 Am J Intl L (2002), 28, 29;
Sylvia Ostry, ‘The WTO and International Governance ’, in Klaus Günter Deutsch and Bernhard Speyer
(eds), The World Trade Organization Millennium Round: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century
(Routledge, 2001), pp. 285, 290, 293.
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from a narrow to a broad one, which corresponds with acceptability by this
extended society. The focal point of their criticism is the WTO’s esoteric, insulated
operative structure, which is allegedly disconnected from the external environment, i.e., themselves. Yet, their target is seldom certain (powerful) Members
of the WTO, such as the United States or the European Union, but rather the
WTO itself.

2. Transparency and external relations
Transparency is attentive to the foregoing social acceptability in that it enhances
visibility and communicativeness of the WTO operation vis-à-vis the
extended base of audience. If the WTO’s decision-making process can be made
transparent to the public, subject to various inputs from various levels of participants of the global trading community – namely, governments, NGOs and the
civil society in general – and thus facilitate discussion, deliberation and
enlightenment on a global scale, the WTO can be deemed acceptable and thus
legitimate.7
The Report seems to largely share this premise. It viewed that NGOs and civil
society are helpful if the WTO’s engagement with them is ‘proper ’.8 It documented
hitherto WTO’s engagement with NGOs and civil society, such as a broader
extent of de-restriction of documents and web-posting,9 NGOs’ improved
access via brieﬁng and attendance to major meetings such as Ministerial
Conferences and other public symposia,10 and ‘ online outreach ’.11 The
Report observed that such engagement has been proper, extolling the Secretariat’s
eﬀort despite such scant resources.12 Then, the Report brought up the merits of
engagement with NGOs and civil society. First, in terms of public relations
(PR) such engagement can promote the WTO’s image and enhance awareness
of the WTO in general.13 Second, NGOs can distribute ‘ knowledge and
expertise ’ and thus contribute to the multilateral trading system in various ways.14
For instance, they can help poor Members negotiate more eﬀectively with their
rich counterparts.15 Third, they may be ‘ quite eﬀective in building caucuses and in
inﬂuencing governments to shift positions and strengthen their commitment to
7 See Paul B. Stephan, ‘ Accountability and International Lawmaking : Rules, Rents and Legitimacy’,
17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. (1996–97), 726–727 (arguing that ‘ the greater the quantity and quality of
information generated during the formation of the rule, the more willing would be the decision-maker to
respect the international norm’).
8 The Report, supra note 1, para. 194.
9 Ibid., para. 183.
10 Ibid., para. 184.
11 Ibid., para. 185.
12 Ibid., para. 180.
13 Ibid., para. 189.
14 Ibid., para. 193.
15 Ibid., para. 197.
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agreed rules ’.16 Finally, they can ‘serve to create space in the domestic policymaking arena for Member governments to overcome domestic barriers to further
liberalization ’.17
Nonetheless, the Report’s position on NGOs and civil society was not without
caution and reservation. First, the Report underlined asymmetrical resources and
capacity among NGOs, in particular between northern and southern NGOs.18
Second, it warned that NGOs might distract and burden certain Members, in
particular developing countries, by ‘ adding parallel tracks’ in trade negotiations.19
Third, it observed that certain NGOs might be neither accountable nor transparent
themselves.20 Fourth, NGOs should be excluded from a deal-making process,
which is reserved only for Members.21 The Report added that Members, not the
WTO Secretariat, should decide on how to deal with NGOs and civil society by
providing certain ‘guidelines ’ on this matter.22 In sum, the Report took a balanced
position on the role and status of NGOs in the WTO.
Despite the foregoing merits of NGOs and civil society as well as an irreversible
trend in their saliency in general, the Report’s forebodings may well be
ampliﬁed for the sake of disillusionment before we ponder on further engagement
with them. First, the inter-governmental nature of the WTO tends to be at odds
with accommodating NGOs beyond a certain level, such as observers. Only
government delegates can negotiate, attend meetings, and sue (or be sued) in
the WTO. NGOs’ various inputs may supplement, but should not supplant,
those governmental activities. Second, an ontological question about ‘ civil society’
should be seriously addressed. What is it ? Is it merely a large cluster of
NGOs ? Or NGOs-plus ? Who are these people ? Some bloggers in the cyberspace ?
Who elected them ? Who are funding them ? Are they ﬁred or hired for what they
say or do ?
It is not my intention to trivialize any possible contributions from speciﬁc NGOs
and more a general civil society, albeit unidentiﬁable. Of course, they can be useful
in many ways, as was noted by the Report. They can help prevent the WTO from
being insulated from the outer world or reneging on a pro-trade biased organization in the past life, i.e., GATT 1947. Cross-fertilization that may transpire from
encounters with them can even enhance the WTO’s legitimacy through better
reconciliation of trade and non-trade values within the WTO. Nonetheless, certain
aspects of NGOs and civil society must be put under strict scrutiny before the
WTO decides to further engage with them. The WTO cannot, and should not,
deal with what cannot be clearly identiﬁed and explained.
16 Ibid., para. 194.
17 Ibid., para. 195.
18 Ibid., paras. 197, 209.
19 Ibid., para. 198.
20 Ibid., paras. 199, 209.
21 Ibid., paras. 200, 210.
22 Ibid., para. 212.
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3. A case for education and social marketing
As discussed above, the WTO still remains an inter-governmental organization.
Yet, such a formal institutional arrangement may not be equated with its deeper
identity, i.e., a ‘ multilateral trading system ’. In other words, the WTO system goes
beyond a mere inter-governmental contract under which a breach may be bought
oﬀ at a certain price against a hoary backdrop of the Lotus-type sovereignty.23 A
true value of a well-functioning multilateral trading system tends to pierce the veil
of sovereignty or intergovernmentalism, reaching out to ordinary people. As
Professor John Jackson suggests, the global trading system features a ‘ rule structure ’ guaranteeing a certain amount of ‘ predictability and stability’ on the basis of
which countless individual economic decisions can be made.24 Likewise, the
Section 301 panel (1999) held that :
The security and predictability in question are of ‘the multilateral trading
system.’ The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of
States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack
of security and predictability aﬀects mostly these individual operators.25

The nature of the WTO as a ‘ legal system ’ tends to rethink the role of NGOs
and civil society in terms of the WTO’s legitimacy. Even much improved WTO
external relations with NGOs and civil society does not necessarily win the deep
trust of ordinary people over the WTO’s value or usefulness, which should be a
paramount yardstick of legitimacy. Although more eﬀorts on the PR front
through allocation of additional resources and personnel, as was recommended
by the Report, may satisfy certain NGOs, that is not simultaneously translated
into the WTO’s eﬀective outreach down to earth. If NGOs have already ﬁxed
their own agenda,26 which may be against the WTO’s basic direction, it is hard
to change their attitudes toward the WTO, even through these PRs.27 Moreover,
there is no guarantee that those NGOs represent the opinions at the grassroot level, i.e., vox populi, about international trade and the WTO. One of the
worst scenarios might be that improved external relations only serve a certain
clientilism for the beneﬁts of certain big, powerful NGOs, while undermining the
23 The WTO’s prototype, i.e., the GATT 1947, did manifest this contract-like nature in its earlier stage
of institutional development. See Sungjoon Cho, ‘The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law’, 65
U. Pitt. L. Rev. (2004), 763, 766–767 [hereinafter Cho, ‘ Remedies’].
24 John H. Jackson, ‘Fragmentation or Uniﬁcation among International Institutions: the World Trade
Organization ’, 31 N. Y. U. J. Int’l & Pol. (1999), 823, 825.
25 WTO Panel Report on United States, Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R,
para. 7.76 (27 January 2000) (emphasis added).
26 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations (Hague Lecture,
Vol. 285) (Hague Academy, Hague, 2000), Chapter III (discussing many possible identities of NGOs such
as pressure groups, advocacy groups, and interest groups).
27 The Report, supra note 1, para. 185. See e.g., ‘Global Trade Watch’, WTO, http://www.citizen.
org/trade/wto/ (‘[T]he WTO system, rules and procedures are undemocratic, un-transparent and nonaccountable and have operated to marginalize the majority of the world’s people.’).
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autonomy and integrity of the WTO in blind pursuit of a ‘ politically correct
path ’.28
Markedly, NGOs’ activism risks over-representing politics and at the same
time under-representing law. When NGOs pass judgment on the WTO, they
seem to regard it as a political entity close to the World Government in which
political battles waged by big corporations determine destinies of varying
important regulatory issues, ranging from the environment to intellectual property
rights.29 However, this political portrayal over-simpliﬁes and exaggerates the true
nature of the WTO. Decisions ﬂowing from the WTO are not necessarily determined by power dynamics or diplomatic contingency. On the contrary, the main
channel through which the WTO yields regulatory decisions is its dispute
settlement system, a (quasi-) judicialized mechanism which generates jurisprudence. Mere political description of the WTO, without taking into account this
jurisprudential aspect, risks misunderstanding the WTO as well as its legitimacy.
The hotly debated Tuna–Dolphin dispute in the early 1990s provides a case in
point. In this dispute, many environmental NGOs severely criticized the GATT
panel report30 on the grounds that the panel unduly rejected a legitimate environmental concern, namely the protection of an endangered species (dolphins), in the
name of free trade.31 However, a closer examination of the panel report would
soon reveal that what the panel condemned was nothing but the ‘ unilateral’
approach taken by the US that failed to take into account development concerns of
a poor tuna-harvesting country (Mexico).32 Nonetheless, the panel report stirred
the public sentiment to a great extent thanks to some NGOs’ eﬀective strategy
employing a rather graphic way of protest, such as the picketing of a ‘ GATTzilla’

28 The report, supra note 1, para. 186.
29 See e.g., Lori Wallach et al., Whose Trade Organization? : A Comprehensive Guide to the World
Trade Organization (2nd edn, New York: The New Press, 1994).
30 GATT Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39 S/155
(3 September 1991) [hereinafter Tuna–Dolphin Report].
31 See Sungjoon Cho, ‘Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the Entropic
Dilemma’, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. (2005), 625, 625–626 [hereinafter Cho, Linkage].
32 Tuna–Dolphin Report, supra note 30, para. 5.28. (‘The United States had not demonstrated to the
Panel – as required of the party invoking an Article XX exception – that it had exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through measures consistent with the
General Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements,
which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states and the
high seas. Moreover, even assuming that an import prohibition were the only resort reasonably available
to the United States, the particular measure chosen by the United States could in the Panel’s view not be
considered to be necessary within the meaning of Article XX(b). The United States linked the maximum
incidental dolphin taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period in order to be able to
export tuna to the United States to the taking rate actually recorded for United States ﬁshermen during the
same period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given point of time,
their policies conformed to the United States’ dolphin protection standards. The Panel considered that a
limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as necessary to protect
the health or life of dolphins.’).

A quest for WTO’s legitimacy 397

devouring poor little dolphins with blood dripping from its mouth, which certainly
enjoyed media focus.33
A radical prescription for overcoming this under-representation of law and
achieving ultimate legitimacy at the grass-roots level may be found in the titular
‘ constitutionalization ’ thesis under which WTO rules can self-execute in the
domestic arena in a similar way that the doctrine of ‘direct eﬀects ’ operates in
the EU.34 However, this option remains ‘ fanciful and even mischievous ’35 in the
absence of necessary supranational paraphernalia at the WTO.36 Yet another
similarly radical proposal has been raised which advocates private parties’ standing in the dispute settlement procedure so that their various interests can
be adjudicated in the WTO.37 However, apart from its sheer infeasibility, this
proposal is tantamount to tackling one problem with another one, namely politicization of the dispute settlement system.38
A more modest yet doable proposal for the legitimization of the WTO might be
to help ordinary people reach a more informed understanding of the WTO
via an improved communication of the WTO norm. Obviously, judgment and
evaluation on the WTO should eventually be the people’s prerogative, not the
politicians’ or NGOs’. Yet, people’s judgment on the WTO need not necessarily
be based on over-politicized images through the lens of scandals, fears, or obsessions, it could instead be based on rational understanding of the WTO norm and
subsequently well-advised deliberation. Alas, WTO panel reports are however
written in a way which even scholars trained in the ﬁeld of international trade
law suﬀer to read and digest them. To ordinary people, these lengthy reports

33 See Cho, ‘ Linkage’, supra note 31, at 625–626.
34 See e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy
for the Beneﬁt of Civil Society? ’, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1998), 1, 30 (arguing that ‘European integration law
and WTO law conﬁrm the Kantian insight that rule of law requires compulsory judicial protection of
freedom and non-discrimination at home and abroad’.).
35 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Cain and Abel – Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law’,
in Joseph H. H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of
International Trade [hereinafter Common Law of International Trade] (New York/Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), p. 4.
36 See Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘ Epilogue : Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in Common
Law of International Trade, supra note 35, at 202.
37 See Andrea K. Schneider, ‘ Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International
Trade Organizations’, 19 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. (1998), 587 (arguing that increased involvement of
private parties to the dispute settlement procedure is a way to increase the WTO’s legitimacy); Glen T.
Schleyer, ‘ Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute
Resolution System’, 65 Fordham L. Rev. (1997), 2275; G. Richard Shell, ‘ The Trade Stakeholders Model
and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization’, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L.
(1996), 359; Steve Charnovitz, ‘Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
Organization ’, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. (1996), 331.
38 Regarding criticism on the proposal to extend the WTO standing to private parties, see Philip M.
Nichols, ‘Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization’, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L.
(1996), 851; Philip M. Nichols, ‘Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties’, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. (1996), 295.
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are full of esoteric WTO semantics and codes which few would actually venture
to read, let alone comprehend.
In order to educate the public about WTO jurisprudence, two conditions should
be met. First, to enable a direct legal discourse between the global trading system
and domestic constituencies, an accessible yet comprehensive heuristic of international trade law should be created. To the extent that panel reports remain
arcane, international trade law cannot be eﬀectively informed, understood, or used
by people. Therefore, greater eﬀorts should be exerted to introduce and teach
international trade law to non-specialists in an accessible yet systematic manner.
This task would be greatly facilitated by compilation of a ‘ Jus Gentium of
International Trade ’ or ‘The Law of Trading Nations ’ which can function as a
Restatement in an undemanding format. Second, a reachable platform, be it
a website or a newsletter, where people can gain access to this heuristic should
also be provided. A public, uncommercialized service in its true sense can help
people better access this educational and consultative avenue. Importantly, such
a platform should be designed in due appreciation of the necessity of ‘social
marketing’ for the sake of intuitive and compelling communication to ordinary
people.39

Conclusion
WTO’s engagement and dialogue with NGOs and civil society is a double-edged
sword. It certainly enhances the WTO’s legitimacy through nurturing transparency
and promoting PRs. On the other hand, it tends to further strain the WTO’s
resources which are already in a sorry state, distract the Secretariat from its main
responsibilities, and even risk undermining the integrity of the WTO through
unnecessary and even harmful over-politicization. Yet, the WTO’s legitimacy is
linked more to its users, i.e. people, than to NGOs. If the WTO is eventually to serve
people and facilitate peace and prosperity, WTO as a legal system should be fully
appreciated and accepted by everyday people. For this purpose, people should be
informed and educated about WTO norms. This didactic approach with its direct
orientation toward ordinary people will sensitize, or sanitize, the domestic legal
terrain not by a directly imposing apparatus such as constitutionalization but more
by an osmotic process of enlightenment. As a result, the gravitational force of
international trade law can be better absorbed in the domestic legal system.40 Under
these circumstances, the WTO’s legitimacy becomes close to a ‘ default pattern ’41

39 See e.g., Social Marketing Institute, Social Marketing, http://www.social-marketing.org/sm.html.
40 See Cho, ‘Remedies’, supra note 23, at 802–807 (discussing ‘ indirect recognition’ which domestic
courts respect WTO rules using domestic legal instruments).
41 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, ‘ Why Do Nations Obey International Law? ’, 106 Yale L. J. (1997), 2599,
2645–2658.
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as more people act as ‘norm entrepreneurs ’42 and ‘ compliance constituencies ’.43
Member countries must realize their own stakes in enhancing the legitimacy
of the WTO, which they own themselves. They have to pour more money and
personnel in this project, and enable the Secretariat to eﬀectively implement the
project. Certainly, NGOs can also lend their hands in disseminating WTO rules to
the public and educating them. Beyond challenging the WTO’s legitimacy, NGOs
can actually contribute to it.

42 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’, 35, Hous. L. Rev (1998), 623, 648.
43 Cf. Miles Kahler, ‘Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization’, 54 Int. Org.
(2000), 661, 675–676.

